Contribute an audit
Signet audits are signed attestations you publish with the signet CLI. Your private key never leaves your machine — the registry only ever sees the signed bundle. Reviewers and downstream tools then reuse your work instead of re-scanning the same code.
1Build the CLI
The CLI is Rust; build it from source (a published binary lands with the tagged release). Point it at a registry with
--registryor theSIGNET_REGISTRYenvironment variable.$ cargo build --release -p signet-cli $ alias signet=./target/release/signet
2Create a signing identity
Generate an ed25519 keypair and register it under a short profile name. Your identity is the key's fingerprint; reputation accrues to it as your audits are peer-verified.
$ signet keys generate --out ~/.signet $ signet keys add me ~/.signet/signet.key # register it as the profile "me" $ signet whoami --key me
3Publish a display name (optional)
Self-asserted and signed by your own key — no admin approval — so the registry shows a human name instead of a raw fingerprint.
$ signet profile --display-name "Ada Lovelace" \ --github https://github.com/ada --key me4Attest a repository at a commit
Run this from the audited git checkout —
signetderives the repo, commit, and file hashes for you. Scope the files you actually reviewed and record what you found (vetted-cleanorvulnerability-found:CWE-…). Add--submitto publish immediately.$ signet attest \ --scope lib/router/index.js:1-150 \ --claim vetted-clean:CWE-79,CWE-89 \ --tool semgrep@1.79.0:p/owasp-top-ten \ --notes "reviewed router input handling" \ --key me --submit --registry <registry>5Document false positives from your scanners
Turn a dismissed scanner finding into signed ground truth: import the Semgrep (or SARIF) result and say whyit's a false positive. Consumers then suppress that exact rule on that exact file content by
ruleId+ hash — the false-positive registry (FR-1), so nobody re-triages the same noise.$ signet fp add --from-semgrep semgrep.json \ --category sanitized-elsewhere \ --justification "redirect target is checked against an allowlist first" \ --key me --submit --registry <registry>6Strengthen the web of trust
Peer-verify other auditors' work to raise its confidence (and your own standing), or flag a claim you can falsify. Verifications and flags are staked — bad-faith actions are slashed.
$ signet verify <attestation-urn> --depth reproduced --key me $ signet disputes # review OSV ground-truth + open flags
Full command reference and the attestation schema live in the design docs. Browse existing auditors to see reputation and coverage in action.